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Abstract
Independent set games are cooperative games defined on graphs, where players are edges and
the value of a coalition is the maximum cardinality of independent sets in the subgraph defined
by the coalition. In this paper, we investigate the convexity of independent set games, as convex
games possess many nice properties both economically and computationally. For independent
set games introduced by Deng et al. [5], we provide a necessary and sufficient characterization
for the convexity, i.e., every non-pendant edge is incident to a pendant edge in the underlying
graph. Our characterization immediately yields a polynomial time algorithm for recognizing
convex instances of independent set games. Besides, we introduce a new class of independent
set games and provide an efficient characterization for the convexity.
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1 Introduction
Cooperative games form an important class in game theory, which have a lot of applications in
economics, computer science and mathematics. One major problem in cooperative games is to
maximize the profit by cooperation and allocate the profit among participants in the cooperation.
There are many criteria for evaluating how “good” an allocation is, such as fairness and stability.
Emphases on different criteria lead to different solution concepts, e.g., the core, the Shapley value,
the nucleolus, the bargaining set, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution [19]. Among those
solution concepts, the core which addresses the issue of stability is one of the most attractive
solution concepts. The core is the set of allocations where no coalition has an incentive to split
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off from the grand coalition, and does better on its own. Hence a game with a non-empty core is
especially interesting. A special subclass of games with a non-empty core is formed by convex 1
games.
Convex games were introduced by Shapley [18], which exhibit many desirable properties in
cooperative game theory. In particular, (i) the core is always non-empty and a core allocation can
be found in polynomial time [18]; (ii) testing whether an allocation belongs to the core can be
performed in polynomial time [6]; (iii) computing the nucleolus can be done in polynomial time
[12]; (iv) there is an appealing snowball effect, i.e., the incentive to join a coalition increases as the
coalition grows larger [18]. We refer to [14, 18] for many interesting properties of convex games
involving other solution concepts. Hence the convexity of cooperative games has attracted a lot of
research efforts, especially for cooperative games arising from combinatorial optimization problems.
However, only a few combinatorial optimization games are universally convex [2, 3, 8, 13]. Hence
one working direction is to characterize the condition for convexity. There is a line of research where
convexity/concavity of cooperative games is characterized by the property of underlying graphs.
Van den Nouweland and Borm [20] showed that communication vertex games are convex if and
only if the underlying graph is cycle-complete and communication arc games are convex if and only
if the underlying graph is cycle-free. Herer and Penn [9] showed that Steiner traveling salesman
games are concave if the underlying graph is a 1-sum of K4 and outerplanar graphs. Hamers [7]
showed that Chinese postman games are concave if the underlying graph is weakly cyclic. Okamoto
[15] showed that vertex cover games are concave if and only if the underlying graph is (K3, P4)-free,
and coloring games are concave if and only if the underlying graph is complete multipartite. Based
on the result of Hamers [7], Albizuri and Hamers [1] characterized the concavity of some variants
of Chinese postman games. Kobayashi and Okamoto [10] initialized the study for the concavity of
spanning tree games, where a sufficient condition and a necessary condition were given separately.
Koh and Sanita` [11] provided the first necessary and sufficient characterization for the concavity of
spanning tree games. Platz [16] gave a complete characterization for the concavity of multi-depot
Steiner traveling salesman games.
In this paper, we focus on the convexity of independent set games. Independent set games
were introduced by Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi [5], which model the following scenario with
projects and participants. Every participant is suitable for two projects but only allowed to join
one project. Every project requires all suitable participants to cooperate to be done. The prob-
lem of maximizing doable projects can be viewed as a maximum independent set problem where
projects are vertices and every participant is an edge joining two suitable projects. We provide a
1concave for cooperative games minimizing the cost by cooperation and allocating the cost among participants in
the cooperation.
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necessary and sufficient characterization for the convexity of independent set games via the under-
lying graph. Our characterization implies that convex independent set games can be recognized
effciently. Besides, we introduce a new class of independent set games and provide a necessary and
sufficent characterization for the convexity.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, notions and notations in graph
theory and game theory are reviewed. Section 3 is devoted to an efficient characterization for the
convexity of independent set games. In Section 4, we introduce a new class of independent set
games and characterize the convexity. Section 5 concludes the results in this paper and discusses
the directions of future work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Graphs
We assume that the readers have a moderate familiarity with graphs. However, some notions and
notations used in this paper should be clarified before proceeding. Throughout, a graph is always
finite, undirected and simple. For n ∈ N, we use Kn to denote the complete graph with n vertices,
use K1,n to denote the graph which is a star, i.e., a complete bipartite graph where one part has
one vertex and the other part has n vertices, use Cn to denote the graph which is a cycle with n
vertices, and use Pn to denote the graph which is a path with n vertices. Since K2 is isomorphic
to K1,1 and P3 is isomorphic to K1,2, both K2 and P3 are stars. Let H be a graph. We use V (H)
to denote the vertex set of H and use E(H) to denote the edge set of H. A graph is said H-free
if it contains no subgraph isomorphic to H. Let G = (V,E) be a graph. For any v ∈ V , NG(v)
denotes the set of vertices adjacent to v, δG(v) denotes the set of edges incident to v, and dG(v)
denotes the degree of v. A vertex is isolated if it is a vertex with degree zero. A vertex is pendant
if it is a vertex with degree one. An edge is pendant if it is incident to a pendant vertex. For any
U ⊆ V , G[U ] denotes the induced subgraph of G. In particular, G[∅] is an empty graph which has
no vertex. For any F ⊆ E, V 〈F 〉 denotes the set of vertices incident only to edges in F , and G[F ]
denotes the edge-induced subgraph of G. An independent set of G is a vertex set U ⊆ V such that
G[U ] has no edge. An edge cover of G is an edge set F ⊆ E such that every vertex of G is incident
to an edge in F . For simplicity, we use α(G) to denote the maximum cardinality of independent
sets in G.
2.2 Cooperative games
Let Γ = (N, γ) be a cooperative game, where N is the set of players and γ : 2N → R is the
characterizatic function with γ(∅) = 0. A subset S of N is called a coalition and N is called the
grand coalition. For each coalition S, γ(S) represents the value distributed among the players in
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S. We call Γ convex if for any S, T ⊆ N ,
γ(S) + γ(T ) ≤ γ(S ∩ T ) + γ(S ∪ T ), (1)
or equivalently, for any i ∈ N and any S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i},
γ(S ∪ {i})− γ(S) ≤ γ(T ∪ {i})− γ(T ). (2)
We call Γ concave if the reverse inequality holds in (1) or (2), and additive if the equality holds in
(1) or (2).
An allocation of Γ is a vector x ∈ RN which consists of proposed amounts to be shared by
players in N . An allocation x is called efficient if
∑
i∈N xi = γ(N), and called coalitionally rational
if
∑
i∈S xi ≥ γ(S) for any S ⊆ N . The core of Γ is the set of allocations that are efficient and
coalitionally rational. The core of a cooperative game may be empty. A cooperative game is called
balanced if the core is non-empty. Balanced games contain convex games as a special subclass [18].
3 Convexity of independent set games
The independent set game introduced by Deng et al. [5] is a cooperative game ΓG = (E, γ) defined
on a graph G = (V,E), where E is the set of players and γ : 2E → N is the characteristic function
such that γ(F ) = α(G[V 〈F 〉]) for any F ⊆ E. We always assume that the underlying graph of
an independent set game has no isolated vertex. Deng et al. [5] showed that an independent set
game is balanced if and only if the underlying graph is a Ko¨nig-Egerva´ry graph [4, 17], where the
maximum cardinality of independent sets is equal to the minimum cardinality of edge covers. In
this paper, we show that an independent set game is convex if and only if every non-pendant edge
is incident to a pendant edge in the underlying graph. We remark that (non-)pendant vertices and
edges always refer to vertices and edges in the ground graph throughout this section.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph without isolated vertices. Let e ∈ E be an edge with endpoints u1, u2
and F ⊆ E\{e} be a set of edges. Clearly, neither u1 nor u2 belongs to V 〈F 〉. Let F ′ = F ∪ {e}.
It follows that V 〈F 〉 ⊆ V 〈F ′〉. Thus every independent set of G[V 〈F 〉] is also an independent set
of G[V 〈F ′〉]. Notice that V 〈F ′〉 ⊆ V 〈F 〉 ∪ {u1, u2}. It follows that a maximum independent set of
G[V 〈F ′〉] is also a maximum independent set of G[V 〈F 〉] if it is a subset of V 〈F 〉. Let ΓG be the
independent set game on G. It follows that γ(F ′) ≥ γ(F ). In the following, we distinguish two
cases of e.
Lemma 1. If e is a pendant edge in G, then γ(F ′) = γ(F ) + 1.
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Proof. Let IF and IF ′ be a maximum independent set in G[V 〈F 〉] and G[V 〈F ′〉], respectively. We
show that |IF ′ | = |IF |+ 1. We may assume that e is only incident to one pendant vertex, say u1,
since otherwise |IF ′ | = |IF |+ 1 is trivial. It follows that u1 ∈ V 〈F ′〉\V 〈F 〉.
We claim that u1 ∈ IF ′ . To see this, we distinguish two cases of V 〈F ′〉. It is trivial if V 〈F ′〉 =
V 〈F 〉 ∪ {u1}, as in this case u1 is an isolated vertex in G[V 〈F ′〉]. Hence assume that V 〈F ′〉 =
V 〈F 〉∪{u1, u2}. In this case we have IF ′∩{u1, u2} 6= ∅, since otherwise IF ′∪{u1} is an independent
set in G[V 〈F ′〉], which contradicts the maximality of IF ′ . Since u1 is a pendant vertex, we may
always assume that u1 ∈ IF ′ by replacing u2 with u1 in IF ′ when necessary.
Now on one hand, IF ′\{u1} is an independent set in G[V 〈F 〉]. Thus |IF ′\{u1}| = |IF ′ |−1 ≤ |IF |.
On the other hand, since u1 is a pendant vertex, IF ∪{u1} is an independent set in G[V 〈F ′〉]. Thus
|IF ′ | ≥ |IF ∪ {u1}| = |IF |+ 1. It follows that |IF ′ | = |IF |+ 1.
Lemma 2. If e is not a pendant edge in G, then γ(F ′) = γ(F ) or γ(F ′) = γ(F ) + 1. Moreover,
if γ(F ′) = γ(F ) + 1, then every maximum independent set in G[V 〈F ′〉] contains an endpoint of e
which is not adjacent to any pendant vertex.
Proof. Assume that e is not a pendant edge in G. It is trivial that γ(F ) ≤ γ(F ′). We show that
γ(F ′) ≤ γ(F ) + 1. Without loss of generality, assume that V 〈F ′〉 6= V 〈F 〉, since otherwise we
have γ(F ′) = γ(F ). Let IF and IF ′ be a maximum independent set in G[V 〈F 〉] and G[V 〈F ′〉],
respectively. It suffices to show that |IF ′ | ≤ |IF |+ 1. Notice that |IF ′ | = |IF | if IF ′ ∩ {u1, u2} = ∅,
as IF ′ is also a maximum independent set in G[V 〈F 〉]. Hence, without loss of generality, assume
that u1 ∈ IF ′ . Notice that IF ′\{u1} is an independent set in G[V 〈F 〉]. It follows that |IF | ≥
|IF ′\{u1}| = |IF ′ | − 1. Therefore, we have γ(F ) ≤ γ(F ′) ≤ γ(F ) + 1.
Now further assume γ(F ′) = γ(F ) + 1. Recall that u1 ∈ IF ′ is the endpoint of e. We show that
u1 is not adjacent to any pendant vertex by proving that dG(v) ≥ 2 for any v ∈ NG(u1). Assume to
the contrary that there is a vertex v∗ ∈ NG(u1) with dG(v∗) = 1. Then {u1, v∗} is a pendant edge,
implying that v∗ 6= u2. It follows that δG(u1) ⊆ F ′ and δG(u1)\{e} ⊆ F . Thus {u1, v∗} is an edge in
F . Since v∗ is a pendant vertex, we have v∗ ∈ V 〈F 〉 and u1 6∈ V 〈F 〉, implying that v∗ is an isolated
vertex in G[V 〈F 〉]. Let I ′F ′ = IF ′\{u1}. Notice that I ′F ′ is an independent set in G[V 〈F 〉] with
cardinality |IF ′ | − 1. Since v∗ and u1 are adjacent in G[V 〈F ′〉], we have v∗ 6∈ IF ′ . Then I ′F ′ ∪ {v∗}
is an independent set in G[V 〈F 〉] with cardinality |IF ′ |, which contradicts γ(F ′) = γ(F ) + 1.
Now we are ready to present our main result.
Theorem 3. Let G = (V,E) be a graph without isolated vertices and ΓG = (E, γ) be the independent
set game on G. Then ΓG is convex if and only if every non-pendant edge is incident to a pendant
edge in G.
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Proof. We first prove the “only if” part. Assume to the contrary that there is a non-pendant edge
e ∈ E which is not incident to any pendant edge in G. Let u1, u2 be the endpoints of e. Thus
dG(v) ≥ 2 for any v ∈ NG(u1) ∪NG(u2). Let Wu1u2 be the set of vertices from NG(u1) ∩NG(u2)
with degree two, i.e., Wu1u2 = {w ∈ NG(u1)∩NG(u2) : dG(w) = 2}. In the following, we distinguish
two cases of Wu1u2 and show that either case leads to a contradiction. Hence we conclude that
every non-pendant edge is incident to a pendant edge in G.
Case 1: |Wu1u2 | ≤ 1. Let S = δG(u1) and T = δG(u2). Since dG(v) ≥ 2 for any v ∈ NG(u1) ∪
NG(u2), we have γ(S) = γ(T ) = α(K1) = 1 and γ(S ∩ T ) = γ({e}) = α(K0) = 0. Moreover,
γ(S ∪ T ) = α(K2) = 1 if |Wu1u2 | = 0, and γ(S ∪ T ) = α(K3) = 1 if |Wu1u2 | = 1. It follows that
γ(S) + γ(T ) > γ(S ∩ T ) + γ(S ∪ T ), which contradicts the convexity of ΓG.
Case 2: |Wu1u2 | ≥ 2. Let w∗ ∈ Wu1u2 . Clearly, NG(w∗) = {u1, u2}. The following arguments
hold for i = 1, 2. Since dG(v) ≥ 2 for any v ∈ NG(ui) ∪ NG(w∗), {ui, w∗} is neither a pendant
edge nor incident to any pendant edge. Let Wuiw∗ be the vertex set defined analogously to Wu1u2 ,
i.e., Wuiw∗ = {w ∈ NG(ui) ∩ NG(w∗) : dG(w) = 2}. Instead of Wu1u2 , we turn to consider the
cardinality of Wuiw∗ . Clearly, Wuiw∗ ⊆ NG(w∗). It follows that Wuiw∗ ⊆ {u1, u2}. However,
|Wu1u2 | ≥ 2 implies that dG(ui) ≥ 3. It follows that Wuiw∗ = ∅ which boils down to Case 1.
Now we prove the “if” part. Assume to the contrary that ΓG is not convex. Then there is an
edge e ∈ E and two edge sets S ⊆ T ⊆ E\{e} such that
γ(S′)− γ(S) > γ(T ′)− γ(T ), (3)
where S′ = S ∪ {e} and T ′ = T ∪ {e}. Let u1, u2 be the endpoints of e. By Lemma 1, e is not a
pendant edge in G, since otherwise γ(S′)− γ(S) = γ(T ′)− γ(T ) = 1. Moreover, Lemma 2 implies
that
γ(S′) = γ(S) + 1 (4)
and
γ(T ′) = γ(T ). (5)
Let IS′ and IT be a maximum independent set in G[V 〈S′〉] and G[V 〈T 〉], respectively. By
Lemma 2, (4) implies that an endpoint of e, say u1, belongs to IS′ but is not adjacent to any
pendant vertex. It follows that δG(u1) ⊆ S′ ⊆ T ′. Since u1 6∈ V 〈T 〉, we have u1 6∈ IT . In the
following, we construct an independent set in G[V 〈T ′〉] with u1 from IT , the size of which is larger
than IT . However, this contradicts (5). Hence we conclude that ΓG is convex.
It remains to construct an asserted independent set in G[V 〈T ′〉]. We first show that IT ∩
NG(u1) 6= ∅ and every vertex in IT ∩ NG(u1) is adjacent to a pendant vertex from V 〈T 〉. Notice
that IT is also an independent set in G[V 〈T ′〉]. If IT ∩NG(u1) = ∅, i.e., u1 is not adjacent to any
6
vertex in IT , then IT ∪ {u1} is an independent set in G[V 〈T ′〉] with cardinality |IT | + 1, which is
trivial. Hence IT ∩ NG(u1) 6= ∅. Since u1 is not adjacent to any pendant vertex, every vertex in
IT ∩NG(u1) is adjacent to a pendant vertex. Notice that IT ∩NG(u1) ⊆ V 〈T 〉. Hence every pendant
vertex which is adjacent to a vertex in IT ∩NG(u1) also belongs to V 〈T 〉. Now we construct a larger
independent set in G[V 〈T ′〉] with u1 from IT . Let I ′T be the vertex set obtained from IT by replacing
each vertex in IT ∩NG(u1) with a pendant vertex from V 〈T 〉 adjacent to it. Clearly, I ′T ⊆ V 〈T 〉.
Moreover, I ′T is a maximum independent set in G[V 〈T 〉]. Hence I ′T is also an independent set in
G[V 〈T ′〉]. Since u1 is not adjacent to any vertex in I ′T , I ′T ∪{u1} is an independent set in G[V 〈T ′〉]
with cardinality |IT |+ 1.
Theorem 3 can be strengthened to a characterization for the additivity of independent set
games.
Corollary 4. Let G = (V,E) be a graph without isolated vertices and ΓG = (E, γ) be the indepen-
dent set game on G. Then ΓG is additive if and only if every non-pendant vertex is adjacent to a
pendant vertex in G.
Proof. Notice that if every non-pendant vertex is adjacent to a pendant vertex, then every non-
pendant edge is incident to a pendant edge. Hence to prove the additivity of ΓG, it suffices to show
that ΓG is concave if and only if every non-pendant vertex is adjacent to a pendant vertex in G.
We first prove the “only if” part. Assume to the contrary that there is a non-pendant vertex
v∗ ∈ V which is not adjacent to any pendant vertex in G. Let S, T ⊆ δG(v∗) be two non-empty
edge sets such that S ∩ T = ∅ and S ∪ T = δG(v∗). It follows that γ(S) = γ(T ) = α(K0) = 0,
γ(S∩T ) = γ(∅) = 0 and γ(S∪T ) = α(K1) = 1. Therefore, we have γ(S)+γ(T ) < γ(S∩T )+γ(S∪T ),
which contradicts the concavity of ΓG.
Now we prove the “if” part. Assume to the contrary that ΓG is not concave. Then there is an
edge e and two edge sets S ⊆ T ⊆ E\{e} such that
γ(S′)− γ(S) < γ(T ′)− γ(T ), (6)
where S′ = S ∪ {e} and T ′ = T ∪ {e}. By Lemma 1, e is not a pendant edge in G, since otherwise
γ(S′)− γ(S) = γ(T ′)− γ(T ) = 1. By Lemma 2, we have
γ(T ′) = γ(T ) + 1 (7)
and
γ(S′) = γ(S). (8)
Moreover, (7) implies that an endpoint of e is neither a pendant vertex nor adjacent to any pendant
vertex, which contradicts our basic assumption.
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One natural question is that whether there are graphs inducing convex but not additive inde-
pendent set games. In Figure 1, we enumerate all connected graphs with 5 vertices that induce
convex independent set games. Clearly, G1 and G2 also induce additive independent set games,
but G3 and G4 do not induce additive independent set games.
Figure 1: All connected graphs with 5 vertices that induce convex independent set games.
Since pendant edges and pendant vertices can be recognized in polynomial time by checking the
degree of every vertex, Theorem 3 and Corollary 4 suggest that both convex instances and additive
instances of independent set games can be recognized efficiently.
Corollary 5. Let G = (V,E) be a graph without isolated vertices and ΓG = (E, γ) be the indepen-
dent set game on G. Then both convexity and additivity of ΓG can be determined in polynomial
time.
4 Convexity of relaxed independent set games
Independent set games introduced by Deng et al. [5] have limitation in the sense that every
project requires all suitable participants to cooperate to be done. Hence a project fails if it misses
any suitable participant in a coalition. However, a project might only require parts of suitable
participants to cooperate to be done, not necessarily all suitable participants. Here we consider a
special case of this scenario, where every project requires all suitable participants in the current
coalition, not necessarily all suitable participants in the grand coalition, to cooperate to be done.
Independent set games complying with the new requirement are called relaxed independent set
games. Formally, the relaxed independent set game is a cooperative game ΓˆG = (E, γˆ) defined on
a graph G = (V,E), where E is the set of players and γˆ : 2E → N is the characteristic function
such that γˆ(F ) = α(G[F ]) for any F ⊆ E. We show that the convexity of relaxed independent set
games admits an efficient characterization.
Theorem 6. Let G = (V,E) be a graph without isolated vertices and ΓˆG = (E, γˆ) be the relaxed
independent set game on G. Then ΓˆG is convex if and only if G is (K3, P4)-free.
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Proof. We first prove the “only if” part. Assume to the contrary that G is not (K3, P4)-free. We
show that any subgraph isomorphic to K3 or P4 gives rise to non-convex instances of ΓˆG.
Assume that H is either K3 or P4. Let S ⊆ E(H) be a set consisting of two incident edges in H,
and let T = E(H)\S. Notice that γˆ(S) = α(P3) = 2, γˆ(T ) = α(K2) = 1, and γˆ(S ∩ T ) = γˆ(∅) = 0.
Moreover, γˆ(S ∪ T ) = α(K3) = 1 if H = K3 and γˆ(S ∪ T ) = α(P4) = 2 if H = P4. In either case,
we have γˆ(S) + γˆ(T ) > γˆ(S ∩ T ) + γˆ(S ∪ T ), which contradicts the convexity of ΓˆG.
Now we prove the “if” part. Let H1, . . . ,Hr be the components of G. Okamoto [15] showed
that a graph is (K3, P4)-free if and only if every component is a star. It follows that
α(G) =
r∑
i=1
α(Hi) =
r∑
i=1
|E(Hi)| = |E|. (9)
Furthermore, we have
γˆ(F ) = α(G[F ]) =
r∑
i=1
|E(Hi) ∩ F | = |F | (10)
for any F ⊆ E. Let e ∈ E and S ⊆ T ⊆ E\{e}. It follows that
γˆ(S′)− γˆ(S) = |S′| − |S| = 1 (11)
and
γˆ(T ′)− γˆ(T ) = |T ′| − |T | = 1, (12)
where S′ = S ∪ {e} and T ′ = T ∪ {e}. Therefore, ΓˆG is additive and hence convex.
From the proof above, Theorem 6 can be strengthened as follows.
Corollary 7. Let G = (V,E) be a graph without isolated vertices and ΓˆG = (E, γˆ) be the relaxed
independent set game on G. Then ΓˆG is additive if and only if G is (K3,P4)-free.
Since (K3, P4)-free graphs can be recognized in polynomial time, Theorem 6 and Corollary 7
suggest that convex (actually additive) instances of relaxed independent set games can be recognized
efficiently.
Corollary 8. Let G = (V,E) be a graph without isolated vertices and ΓˆG = (E, γˆ) be the relaxed
independent set game on G. Then convexity (actually additivity) of ΓˆG can be determined in
polynomial time.
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5 Concluding remarks
We study the convexity of independent set games in this paper. We show that an independent
set game is convex if and only if every non-pendant edge is incident to a pendant edge in the
underlying graph. Since convex games are population monotonic and hence totally balanced, a
possible direction for future work is to characterize population monotonicity or total balancedness
of independent set games based on the characterization of convexity. Deng et al. [5] proved that
an independent set game is balanced if and only if the underlying graph is a Ko¨nig-Egerva´ry
graph. Thus any characterization for convexity, population monotonicity or total balancedness of
independent set games also provides a sufficient condition for Ko¨nig-Egerva´ry graphs.
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